Saudi Arabia/United States: Strange Bedfellows in the Middle East

By Barry Rubin

What is the difference between Saudi and U.S. policy in the Arabic-speaking Middle East? It's complex but fascinating and if you can understand the weird twists and turns in this situation you can understand the Middle East. While the two countries may appear aligned in fact--and often when they have the same goals--their policies differ extensively. And the Saudis are not always wrong. Arguably, they are pursuing their own interests more effectively than is the United States.

The Saudis define the four main enemies today as:

--Al-Qaida

--The Muslim Brotherhood

--Iran

--Shia Muslims as political forces: as ruling Iraq; Hizballah in Lebanon; and the Shia majority in Bahrain.

All four of these forces are perceived as threatening Saudi stability and even survival. Al-Qaida, of course, originated as a revolutionary movement to overthrow the Saudi monarchy.

Notably, Israel is not on that list. Whatever violent and vile rhetoric that comes from Saudi Arabia and whatever monies spent by private individuals, the Saudis are simply not much concerned about Israel or combating it. Unlike the revolutionary Islamists and especially the Shia ones, Israel does not threaten Saudi society and internal stability. And whatever lip service is given to the contrary, Israel doesn't threaten international Saudi interests either.

Among the four principle Saudi enemies, U.S. policy only sees al-Qaida as a total enemy of itself. It views Iran as a big problem that might somehow be reconciled through appeal to what is thought to be its true self-interest. And it has viewed the Muslim Brotherhood—shocking but true—as an ally. In Iraq, the United States helped put Shias into power and President Obama showed a willingness--before the State Department warned him that Tehran would gain--to do the same thing in Bahrain. The United States would be better off if it had the same basic list as Saudi Arabia, with the addition of the Iraqi, Syrian, and other Sunni Muslim radical Islamists supported by the monarchy.

On Iran, the Saudis are harder-line than is the Obama Administration. The regime views Iran as a deadly adversary trying to destroy Sunni Islam (the Iranians are majority Shia Muslim) and the Arabs (the Iranians are majority ethnic Persian). The Saudis view the United States as naïve on this matter. They would like to see the United States or even Israel attack Iran to destroy its nuclear weapons’ facilities. Of course, that’s as long as the Saudis don’t have to take any risks themselves.

The same Saudi antagonism applies to the hated Muslim Brotherhood. True, there was a time when the Saudis were protectors of the Brotherhood, when it was a fugitive group persecuted by radical Arab nationalist regimes like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. But that time is long over. While the Saudis are just as militantly "Islamic" as the Brotherhood, the Brotherhood opposes the monarchical principle and it does not accept the Saudis Wahhabi brand of Islam.

From the Saudis’ perspective, U.S. support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria is foolish. The Muslim Brotherhood reciprocates, listing the Saudis (and its ally the United Arab Emirates) as one of Egypt's three main enemies, along with the United States and Israel.

Iraq:

The U.S. government backed a Shia majority government with autonomy. Loathing the Shia and seeing them as a cats-paw for Iran, Saudi Arabia encouraged Sunni Islamists to launch a terrorist revolt and were ultimately defeated. The irony is that the Sunni Islamists came under al-Qaida leadership, putting the two enemies--Saudi Arabia and al-Qaida--on the same side temporarily. The Saudis have now given up the subversive effort in Iraq.

But for several years, Saudi Arabia was backing America’s number-one enemy in killing Americans! At the same time, though more excusably, the United States was backing forces  influenced by Iran. In defense of the Shia, the United States had no choice because not only were the Iranians their fellow Shia but by boycotting them and backing a terrorist insurgency against them, the Shia were left no choice by the Arab world.

At any rate, the United States and Saudi Arabia, despite both acting on anti-Iran sentiment,  were on opposite sides in a war!

Syria:

Both the U.S. and the Saudis want to see the Bashar al-Assad regime overthrown, in large part because it is an ally of Tehran. But by whom? The Obama Administration’s candidate is the Muslim Brotherhood. The Saudis want anyone but the Muslim Brotherhood. Both are equally opposed to al-Qaida.

So the Saudis back a third force, the non-al-Qaida Salafists, just as extreme but not interested in making direct attacks against the United States or Saudi Arabia. The Obama Administration has been okay with this strategic difference though it is starting to get a bit nervous about Salafist terrorists running around with advanced weapons.

At any rate, both of them acting on anti-Iran and anti-al-Qaida sentiment the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were backing different Islamist factions!

Lebanon:

Here, too, the Saudis wanted to back Sunni Muslims. But since there are few Sunni Islamists and the kingdom has old ties to the Hariri faction which provides the anti-Syria, anti-Iran Sunni leadership, the Saudis are backing the pro-Western moderates.

The United States was pretty inactive, giving aid to the politically ineffective Lebanese army but not lifting a finger to help the moderate coalition. As Washington looked on with apparent indifference, Hizballah and the pro-Syria, pro-Iran politicians took over Lebanon.

Once Syria falls, which may not be too soon, the Saudis will turn toward battling its Shia enemies—which means Hizballah—and Iranian influence in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Obama Administration may be restrained in embracing a terrorist-led government in Lebanon but will remain passive.

An any rate, the Saudis—for their own interests—have been defending Western interests in Lebanon while the West (especially France alongside the United States) are appeasing a radically anti-Western, terrorist-led regime. The Saudis are seeking more influence in Lebanon by opposing a weakened Hizballah and strengthening Sunni Muslim (often Islamist) elements to battle Iranian influence.

Of course, this doesn't make the Saudis good guys as such, especially since the government and wealthy citizens of that country spend a lot of money on promoting radical views of Islam in many countries.   Yet what is necessary is for all those on the anti-Islamist side to do the most fundamental thing necessary in making foreign policy: to define properly friends and enemies.

It may be said that even while different interests promote conflicting foreign policies, the United States has been remarkably unsuccessful in coordinating with the Saudis. Except on Syria the two countries don't work together, and in Syria's case that cooperation isn't a good thing. Generally, the crowning irony is that the Saudis are now thoroughly disgusted with the Obama Administration for being soft on Islamist, and especially Iranian and Shia, threats to the kingdom.

If you are interested in reading more about the Arab-Israeli conflict, current regional situation you're welcome to read my book Tragedy of the Middle East online or download it for free.

This article is published on PJMedia. 

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--------------------

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His next book, Nazis, Islamists and the Making of the Modern Middle East, written with Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, will be published by Yale University Press in January 2014. His latest book is Israel: An Introduction, also published by Yale. Thirteen of his books can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center including The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

  

Breaking News: It's Official, Iran's Presidential Election is A Sham

By Barry Rubin

The names have now been announced of who will be allowed to run for president of Iran by the regime in the June 14 elections. Six of eight are supporters of the current ruling faction; the rest are two weaker candidates of the other two factions. he outgoing president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tumultuous time in office has left many dissatisfied especially since he has mismanaged the economy and made Iran’s international situation worse by his provocative behavior.

With less than a month to go before the elections--the campaign is only three weeks long to make things harder for the opposition--it is now clear who the candidates are and all those disagreeing with the dominant faction have been vetoed by the six-member Council of Guardian. This council is controlled by the country’s real ruler, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But the complex maneuvers leading up to the election have given him a huge political headache.

The core of the problem is that there are three factions. Khamenei doesn’t want two of the factions-- the super-hardliners and the reformists—to win but only the third group, his hardliners.

The super-hardline faction’s candidate was Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Ahmadinejad’s son-in-law and man widely seen as a puppet for him. Khamenei hates Mashaei and Mashaei was disqualified.

Also disqualified was the potential “reform” candidate, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjan. One must hesitate to call him a true reformer. Rafsanjani is an insider, indeed a former president (1989-1997), who used to be an ally of Khamenei but now is a fierce rival. Rafsanjani is pragmatic and reportedly conspicuously corrupt. He does not want to overturn the regime but change its direction, keep it more out of international trouble, and find some way to shed the sanctions imposed to stop Iran’s nuclear program. He might have tried to pull Iran back from international confrontations. The 78-year-old Rafsanjani is a dubious hero. He is not part of the reform movement yet he was the best bet they have. The Iranian ruling elite hates him, too. There are genuine differences between him and Khamenei about the country's direction.

So who does the elite fix the election for as winner? There are eight candidates left in the election:

There is  former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati who is close to Khamenei.

Then there is  Muhammad Bagher Ghalibaf the mayor of Tehran and close to Khamenei.

Of course there is Iran's nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. He is very close to Khamenei, perhaps his favorite though he has no administrative experience. .

Or perhaps you like former speaker of parliament Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel who is close to Khamenei.

Some might prefer Asan Rowhani, former nuclear negotiator and Khamenei's man on the National Security Council.

But if you want someone else there is Gholam Ali Haddad Adel whose daughter is married to Khamenei's son.

There are two candidates not from Khamenei's faction. Muhammad Reza Aref is former vice-president and represents the reform group. Mohsen Rezaei, former commander of the Revolutionary Guard is a stand-in for the Ahmadinejad faction.

You might think that six Khamenei followers might split the hardline vote but don't worry as that will be taken care of in the ballot-counting if necessary.

Ironically, the main impact of the Iranian election may be on the West. Articles and arguments had been already appearing claiming that a post-election Iran would be more moderate and that the next Iranian president would be willing to abandon the regime's subversive foreign policy and  nuclear weapons' program. Western negotiators wanted to say: Give Iran a chance. That will be much harder now.

For an explanation of the Iranian election in song, see here. I promise you won't regret it.

If you are interested in reading more about the history of U.S.-Iran relations and the Iranian revolution you're welcome to read my book Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran online or download it for free..

Please be subscriber 31,483 (among more than 50,000 total readers). Put email address in upper right-hand box: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com

 We’d love to have your support and work hard to earn it. See our new feature with 13 free books at http://www.gloria-center.org. Why not make a tax-deductible donation to the GLORIA Center by PayPal: click here.

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For tax-deductible donations in Canada and the UK, write us here.

--------------------

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His next book, Nazis, Islamists and the Making of the Modern Middle East, written with Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, will be published by Yale University Press in January 2014. His latest book is Israel: An Introduction, also published by Yale. Thirteen of his books can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center including The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Iran’s Presidential Election: Plenty of Problems and No Real Change

By Barry Rubin

In June 14 elections are supposed to be held to elect Iran’s new president. The outgoing president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tumultuous time in office has left many dissatisfied especially since he has mismanaged the economy and made Iran’s international situation worse by his provocative behavior.

Now, however, the election process  itself may have broken down or at least is developing very much to the regime's dislike. With less than a month to go before the elections--the campaign is only three weeks long to make things harder for the opposition--it isn’t even clear who the candidates are going to be. The six-member Council of Guardians has not yet decided who will be allowed to run. This council is controlled by the country’s real ruler, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But the complex maneuvers leading up to the election have given him a huge political headache.

The core of the problem is that there are three factions. Khamenei doesn’t want two of the factions-- the super-hardliners and the reformists—to win, while the third group, the hardliners, are having trouble picking a candidate.

The super-hardline faction’s candidate is Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Ahmadinejad’s son-in-law and man widely seen as a puppet for him. Khamenei hates Mashaei and it is quite possible, though not inevitable, that Mashaei will be disqualified. At any rate, Mashaei won’t win the election

The potential “reform” candidate is Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani but one must hesitate to call him a true reformer. Rafsanjani is an insider, indeed a former president (1989-1997), who used to be an ally of Khamenei but now is a fierce rival. Rafsanjani is pragmatic and reportedly conspicuously corrupt. He does not want to overturn the regime but change its direction, keep it more out of international trouble, and find some way to shed the sanctions imposed to stop Iran’s nuclear program. He would try to pull Iran back from international confrontations.

The 78-year-old Rafsanjani is a dubious hero. He is not part of the reform movement yet he is the best bet they have. The Iranian ruling elite hates him, too. There are genuine differences between him and Khamenei about the country's direction. But even if he were to be allowed to win, there is the precedent of the relatively moderate President Muhammad Khatami who served eight years and was unable to change a single thing.

The first question is whether Rafsanjani would be seen as a real alternative by those who are discontented with the country’s current situation.  The second question is whether he would be allowed to run. The third question is whether he would be allowed to win if he received the most votes.

So far that means two “oppositionists,” though both could be considered part of the broader establishment. But who does the elite want to win? The problem is that they are not united and if that doesn’t change they would split the “conservative” vote.

There have been three potential establishment candidates. Perhaps the most likely consensus candidate and eventual winner is Saeed Jalili. He is very close to Khamenei and has been his head negotiator on nuclear issues. He is a former deputy foreign minister and member of Iran’s national security council who was badly wounded in the Iran-Iraq war.

Other possible Khamenei picks are former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati and former speaker of parliament Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, both of whom are also close to the supreme leader.

Will Khamenei get his political troops in line? Can voters be intimidated or Rafsanjani be credibly smeared? Things are going to get very messy and the results are hardly likely to improve Iran’s image.

If Jalili wins, any attempt to portray him as a moderate will be ridiculous. He might be less provocative than Ahmadinejad, who seemed to delight in stirring up antagonisms and making statements that even Western leaders had to brand as provocative but the differences will be meaningless. And Jalili  or the other Khamenei loyalists will not retreat one step on pushing Iran’s nuclear weapons’ program.

Ironically, the main impact of the Iranian election may be on the West where articles and arguments are already appearing claiming that a post-election Iran will be more moderate and that the next Iranian president would be willing to abandon the regime's subversive foreign policy and the nuclear weapons' program. The idea of giving Iran a chance to show it has changed will probably take up Western negotiating policy for the rest of 2013 and into next year.

This article is published on PJMedia.

Please be subscriber 31,483 (among more than 50,000 total readers). Put email address in upper right-hand box: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com

 We’d love to have your support and work hard to earn it. See our new feature with 13 free books at http://www.gloria-center.org. Why not make a tax-deductible donation to the GLORIA Center by PayPal: click here.

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For tax-deductible donations in Canada and the UK, write us here.

--------------------

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His next book, Nazis, Islamists and the Making of the Modern Middle East, written with Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, will be published by Yale University Press in January 2014. His latest book is Israel: An Introduction, also published by Yale. Thirteen of his books can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center including The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan Praised at White House as He Subverts U.S. Interests

By Barry Rubin

"So fragile was the structure of their reality that a single unsubsumed consciousness, a solitary ripple in their little pond was enough to roil the waters into a frothing, burbling foam.”—Norman Spinrad, The Void Captain’s Tale (1985)

Consider five factors that had no effect on the very warm reception given by  President Barack Obama to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan:

--While the U.S. government has pressured Erdogan not to visit the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, Erdogan announced in the White House Rose Garden that he would do so. An alleged U.S. ally says publicly in front of Obama while being hosted by him that he is going to defy the United States.

This is not some routine matter. With previous presidents, if an ally was going to do something like that he would say nothing at the time and then months later would subvert U.S. policy. Or better yet the foreign leader would not do so. To announce defiance in such a way is a serious sign of how little respect Middle East leaders have for Obama—and U.S. policy nowadays—and how little Obama will do about it.

--Equally bad is the fact that Erdogan directly promised Obama that he would conciliate with Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cooperated because Obama asked him to do so. That’s what U.S. allies do. But immediately Erdogan showed he would pay no attention to the agreement he made.

His negotiators subverted it in several ways, including the demands for ridiculously large amounts of money, the delay in the promised return of the Turkish ambassador to Israel, the continuation of legal action against Israeli officials involved in the Mavi Marmara affair, when Israeli soldiers were attacked by Turkish terrorists demanding to sail to Gaza to deliver equipment to Hamas.

So a second time  Erdogan betrayed Obama and make the president look foolish (that is, if anyone in the mass media pointed it out). Again, there was no U.S. criticism of the move or apparent pressure to make Erdogan keep his promise.

There are three other ways that Erdogan has subverted U.S. interests with minimal costs. In fact, the Obama Administration has usually furthered this behavior.

--Some small U.S. diplomatic protests were made about the growing internal repression in Turkey and human rights’ violations there. Increasingly, the country lives under a reign of intimidation even as the Western media mostly ignores this situation. Since the United States keeps praising him, Erdogan can demoralize his opponents, who cannot hope for foreign help, even as he carries on a policy of spreading anti-Americanism in Turkey. The political power of the Turkish armed forces--the traditional guarantor of the republic and stability in the country was dismantled by Erdogan with U.S. approval. The Turkish media was subverted with only an occasional American squeal of complaint. Now he's destroying the independent judicial system, the last barrier to his assault on democratic rule. The U.S. embassy in Turkey consistently warned about what has been happening; the White House ignored this information.

--With the Obama Administration’s permission, the Turkish government violates the sanctions against Iran with ever-larger trade and major bilateral cooperation projects. Erdogan's consistent defenses of Iran's policies (though the two countries are at odds over Syria) have been forgiven and forgotten by the White House.

--Finally, in many ways the Turkish government has been taking the lead on setting U.S. policy toward Syria. It was Erdogan who largely determined that the official opposition exile leadership would be dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, a path followed by Obama. (I can't prove it but I'll bet that Turkey's regime promised Obama that if he would declare support for the rebels verbally and let them be armed by Qatar and Saudi Arabia then Assad would easily fall. I'd also bet that Erdogan assured Obama that if the president helped the rebels a moderate government would emerge in Syria.)

Meanwhile, Obama has praised Erdogan unstintingly. Obama thinks Erdogan is the very model of a “moderate Islamist” and since Obama's strategy is to support such people in much of the Arab world, Erdogan has been his guide to the region, though this has meant supporting the radical Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood. What is especially ironic is that Obama believed that Erdogan's goals were essentially the same as those of the United States while Erdogan was in fact following a profoundly anti-American policy designed to bring hostile Islamist governments to power. Remember this is no longer the old Western-oriented Turkey of previous decades but a radical--if concealed--Islamist regime.

At the Washington meeting, Obama and Erdogan agreed that Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad must go. But who will they replace him with and how will they get rid of him? Obama said that the Syrian dictator, “Needs to transfer power to a transitional body….That is the only way we're going to resolve this crisis."

But that is demonstrably false because Assad won’t step down. So what’s the United States going to do about it?

Once again the Turkish government has taken the lead on U.S. policy by pushing for direct U.S. aid to the rebels. That means giving money, weapons, and other aid to the Muslim Brotherhood and more radical groups to take power because the real moderates in the Syrian opposition are rare.

And again what is Obama going to do to bring about this objective? 'Will he continue to follow advice from Erdogan which has already proven to be wrong  because it is based on the interests of a Turkish Islamist regime seeking to promote Sunni Islamism and Turkish influence in the region?

Obama’s expressed hope of creating a Syria that is “a source of stability, not extremism” is very dangerous because he might well hope that but it is not a realistic goal. And again what is Obama going to do to bring about this objective?  

[Incidentally. the U.S. government has apologized to Israel for U.S. officials confirming to the New York Times that a ground attack within Syria earlier this month was staged by Israel. Publicly stating this information forced Syria (and Hizballah and Iran) to officially threaten Israel with retaliation, thus endangering Israel.] 

Now, too, Iran, Russia, and Hizballah are stepping up support for Assad. It is clear that Russia will block tougher action in the UN Security Council.  It is also stepping up arms shipments to Assad. If Russia provides Syria with advanced anti-aircraft missiles these could be used to shoot down any U.S. planes that tries to enforce a no-fly zone. Yet Obama doesn't have the credibility or leverage with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who from every indication holds him in contempt as a weakling, to stop Moscow from showing that it is the stronger, more reliable ally. Hizballah has up to 5,000 fighters inside Syria now, though they have been mainly employed in holding territory vital for Assad's survival.

The rebels will not win without a lot of U.S. help. This civil war is becoming an international test of wills in which Obama--for reasons that are not unreasonable--doesn't want to fight. Yet does that mean the United States will accept a humiliating defeat at the hands of Tehran and Moscow? Fortunately, while the rebels cannot win, they also are likely to hold much of Syria. In other words, Assad can't put down the rebellion either. But the result will be: stalemate; continued war for two years or more; tens of thousands of more deaths.

One day there will be congressional investigations on how U.S. policy armed terrorist and even, albeit unintentionally, al-Qaida groups. It will be too late.  The situation in Syria makes the Iran-Contra affair--U.S. involvement during the Reagan Administration in supplying arms to pro-American Nicaraguan rebels--look like a picnic.

The situation is getting very dangerous and with a "friend" like Erdogan it is clear that Obama’s policy toward Syria, Iran, the advance of revolutionary Islamism, and the Israel-Palestinian “peace process,” is in serious trouble.

This article is published on PJMedia.

Please be subscriber 31,476 (among more than 50,000 total readers). Put email address in upper right-hand box: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com

 We’d love to have your support and work hard to earn it. See our new feature with 13 free books at http://www.gloria-center.org. Why not make a tax-deductible donation to the GLORIA Center by PayPal: click here.

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For tax-deductible donations in Canada and the UK, write us here.

--------------------

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His next book, Nazis, Islamists and the Making of the Modern Middle East, written with Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, will be published by Yale University Press in January 2014. His latest book is Israel: An Introduction, also published by Yale. Thirteen of his books can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center including The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

More Violence in Benghazi Shows After-Effects of Scandal

As I've noted, Libya is starting to fall apart and the Benghazi scandal cover-up prevented the Obama Administration from taking serious action in regard to that country, including retaliation against the terrorist group that the United States knows was responsible.

In the last week, there was a car bomb and four attacks on Libyan military posts in Benghazi. The al-Qaida affiliate that murdered four Americans controls parts of the city and is unchallenged by the central government, which has been too weak to confront those who reject its authority.

Al-Qaida still controls part of the city's entrances and the hospital where the U.S. ambassador's body was taken by them last September 11. It has faced zero retaliation by the U.S. government and no pressure from Washington for the Libyan government to crack down on it.

Remember that the government's attempt to make people forget the scandal and the insistence that the attack was caused by a demonstration against a video gone wrong has prevented the highlighting of the actual murders and action taken against them.